Can Futures Markets Quell Money Market Volatility?
A Look at US Money Markets Before and
Since Commodities Futures Contracts by Santos, Joseph
South Dakota State University
Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional
Repository and Information Exchange
Department of Economics Staff Paper Series Economics
3-15-2000
Can Futures Markets Quell Money Market
Volatility? A Look at US Money Markets Before
and Since Commodities Futures Contracts
Joseph Santos
South Dakota State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/econ_staffpaper
Part of the Economic History Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and
Information Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Department of Economics Staff Paper Series by an authorized administrator of Open
PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository and Information Exchange. For more information, please contact
michael.biondo@sdstate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Santos, Joseph, "Can Futures Markets Quell Money Market Volatility? A Look at US Money Markets Before and Since Commodities
Futures Contracts" (2000). Department of Economics Staff Paper Series. Paper 140.
http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/econ_staffpaper/140
Can Futures Markets Quell Money Market Volatility? 
A Look At US Money Markets Before and 
Since Commodities Futures Contracts
1 
(JEL Classification Codes E44, Gl3, Nll) 
by Joseph Santos 
Economics Staff Paper 00-3 
March 2000 
I The author would like to thank Howard Bodenhorn, :Vtichacl D. Bordo, Michael Edelstein, William Lang. Bashir Qasmi. Hugh Rockoff, Hiroki 
Tsurumi, Eugene N. White and Jason Zimmerman for their helpful suggestions. Thanks also to the participants at the Economics Seminar at 
South Dakota State Cniversity. All remaining errors belong to the authoL 
Can Futures Markets Quell Money Market Volatility? A Look At US Money Markets Before and Since 
Commodities Futures Contracts 
Joseph Santos 
Assistant Professor 
Department of Economics 
South Dakota State University 
Abstract 
This paper offers the introduction of futures markets, and the resulting substitution away from consignment 
contracts around 1874, as the reason why early US money markets are relatively more volatile, and far less seasonal, 
than their post-1874 counterparts. Until 1874, movements in interest rates were erratic and financial instabilities 
imparted relatively large shocks to money markets, particularly in the autumn months. After 1874, the effects of 
financial instabilities on interest rates diminished and the regularization of seasonal movements was attained. The 
paper demonstrates the plausibility of this claim using the standard mean-variance framework of the spot price 
volatility literature, where producers and speculators are assumed risk averse and risk neutral, respectively. Results 
indicate that the ability to hedge in the futures markets increases the price sensitivities of aggregate supply and 
aggregate demand, thereby diminishing the variability of both the price level and the interest rate in the presence of 
supply and/or demand shocks. 
Key Words: interest rate volatility, seasonal cycles, futures contracts, financial innovations, antebellum money 
markets. 
1. Introduction 
The effect of financial innovations on the behaviors of macroeconomic time series initiated much research 
in both economics and finance in the last two decades. Two such cases included the Federal Reserve's role in the 
cessation of transitory fluctuations in interest rates, and the stabilizing effects of commodity futures contracts on 
spot price variability. And although examined recently, the origins of both topics date back to the very nadir of 
macroeconomic studies. Indeed, early students of transitory seasonal fluctuations debated whether such movements 
were relevant to the study of other, seemingly more important, business cycles [See Jevons ( 1884), Kemmerer 
(1910), Kuznets (1933), Mitchell (1927), Pigou (1929), Bums and Mitchell (1947)]. Similarly, historians of the 
North American grain trade long suggested that commodity futures markets diminished spot price volatility [See 
Clark (1966), Chandler ( 1977), Irwin (1954) and Rothstein (1966)]. 
This paper unites these literatures by linking a change in the behavior of US short-term interest rates to the 
evolution of commodity futures trading. In particular, the introduction of futures markets, and the resulting 
substitution away from consignment contracts, is offered as the primary reason why early US money markets exhibit 
relatively less volatility, and far more seasonality, after 1874. The paper argues that, until 1874, movements in 
interest rates are erratic and financial instabilities impart relatively large shocks to money markets, particularly in the 
autumn months. While after 1874, the effects of financial instabilities on interest rates diminishes and the 
regularization of seasonal movements is attained, thanks in large part to the growth in commodity futures trading at 
that time. 
The plausibility of this claim is demonstrated using the standard mean-variance framework of the spot price 
volatility literature. In particular, the paper models the optimizing behaviors of risk averse producers and risk 
neutral speculators in the absence and presence of futures contracts. Results indicate that the ability to hedge in 
futures markets increases the price sensitivities of aggregate supply and aggregate demand, thereby diminishing the 
variability of both the price level and the interest rate in the presence of supply and/or demand shocks. 
2. The Traditional Interpretation of US Short-term Interest Rate Behavior 
Most economic historians accept that US short-term interest rate fluctuations prior to the founding of the 
Fed are mean reverting and seasonal [See Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Grandy and LaCroix (1996) and Mankiw, 
Miron and Weil (1987)]. According to Kemmerer (1910), in a monograph prepared for the National Monetary 
Commission, annual transitory fluctuations in interest rates were fueled primarily by seasonal interregional cash 
transfers that financed the planting, harvesting and moving of the nation's crops.2 Indeed, that economists consider 
such transitory fluctuations in early American money markets commonplace is evidenced by the vast (and only) 
current literature on this topic; namely, that which examines its abrupt disappearance around 1914. [See Angelini 
(1992), Barsky, et. al. (1988), Clark (1986), Fishe (1991), Fishe and Wohar (1990), Friedman and Schwartz, (1963), 
Holland and Toma (1991), Kool (1995), Mankiw and Miron (1986), Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987), Miron 
(1986), Miron (1988), and Toma (1993)]. The literature surrounding this conundrum is centered on the 
establishment of the Federal Reserve System. Indeed, the most popular explanation is that of Miron (1988), who 
argues that the Fed began to smooth short-term interest rates shortly after 1914, thus quelling all transitory 
fluctuations present in US money markets.3 
3. Transitory Fluctuations in Antebellum Money Markets 
In this section, the time series properties of antebellum interest rates (in Boston, New York, Philadelphia 
and New Orleans) are examined and compared to those of their post-1875 counterparts in order to determine if US 
money markets behave in a manner relatively unchanged prior to 1914. 4 All four series, presented in figure I, are 
taken from Bodenhom (1992) and represent short-term discount rates on commercial paper and bills of exchange. 
That both ante- and post-bellum US money market rates, prior to the establishment of the Federal Reserve 
in 1914, are mean reverting is well-established in the literature [See Bodenhom (1992) and Grandy and LaCroix 
(1993)].5 Nonetheless, summary statistics presented in table 1 illustrate that antebellum money markets are 
relatively more volatile than either of the post-1875 series. Indeed, Boston, the northernmost money market, and 
New Orleans, the southernmost marketplace and 'hub' of the cotton trade, report standard deviations in excess of 
400 basis points; in addition, ante-bellum rates report the highest means of any series. 
2 Kemmerer, E.W., Seasonal Variations in the Relative Demand For Money and Capital in the United States, p. 292. 
3 Miron, Jeffrey A. 1986. "Financial Panics, the Seasonality of the Nominal Interest Rate, and the Founding of the Fed," p. 125. 
' The data are from, Bodenhom, Howard, "Capital Mobility and Financial Integration in Antebellum America," pp. 603-608. See data appendix for 
details. 
5ln addition to being stationary, both Bodenhom (1992) and Grandy and laCroix (1993) identify the antebellum series as cointegrated. 
Table 1: Summary statistics, antebellum and postbellum series, monthly data in levels. 
Sample Period 
I 
Mean 
I 
Standard 
I 
Adjusted 
I 
F Value6 
I 
Prob F 
Deviation R2 
New York, 1843:07 -1859:12 6.82 2.70 O.ol 1.13 0.3401 
New York (a), 1875:01 - 1910:12 4.88 1.12 0.10 5.24 0.0001 
New York (b), 1920:01 -1933:12 3.71 1.97 0.02 1.41 0.1635 
Boston, 1836:01 -1859: 12 9.28 4.73 0.00 0.89 0.5545 
Philadelphia, 1839:02 -1857:06 8.74 3.30 0.01 1.13 0.3395 
NewOrleans, 1839:11-1859:12 9.12 4.05 0.02 1.48 0.1390 
Adjusted Wis based on the following regression specification: 
x, c + 82(d2) + 83(d3) + ... + 812(dl 2) + c, First differences of NY (b) are used due to nonstationarity of these data. 
Moreover, the adjusted R2s reported in table 1 suggest seasonal variations are responsible for relatively 
little of the transitory fluctuations in antebellum interest rates; for example, in New York the seasonal cycle explains 
1% of the total variation in the rate between 1843-1859, 10% between 1875-1910 and 2% between 1920-1936. 
Indeed, as with the post-Fed series, the hypothesis that the seasonal coefficients are jointly zero cannot be rejected 
for any of the antebellum samples. 7 Hence, fluctuations in antebellum rates are transitory and large, but not seasonal 
in nature. 
That a seasonal cycle is not always present in US interest rates prior to the founding of the Federal Reserve 
is seemingly puzzling. But, a closer inspection illustrates that antebellum rates exhibit seasonal patterns (figure 2.a.) 
like those of 1875-1910 (figure 2.b. ); by contrast, the complete absence of a seasonal pattern occurs only in the post-
1914 sample (figure 2.c.).8 Hence, an appropriate description ofante-bellum rate behavior is that occasional and 
large transitory fluctuations in the autumns of some years between 1836 and 1859 produce a seasonal pattern in 
interest rates that is not statistically significant due to the irregularity with which these fluctuations occur. Indeed, 
while autumn rates exceed their summer counterparts in 92% of the years between 1875 and 1910, such differentials 
are observed in only 54% of the antebellum years. Hence, while fluctuations in US interest rates are transitory up to 
1914, antebellum interest rates are relatively more volatile and less seasonal than any other pre-Fed series. 
4. An Institutional Explanation for the Behavior of Early US Money Markets 
In general, two explanations for the relatively volatile and nonseasonal nature of US interest rates prior to 
the late 1800s exist. The first assumes that market volatility and the absence of seasonal strains are unrelated. That 
"Joint test of seasonal significance, HO : 82 83 • • • 812 = 0, where 8; is the seasonal dummy in month i. 
'Autocorrelation functions of the first difference of each data series, examined at multiples ofrhe seasonal span (12), confirm these results. 
"These sample periods are chosen simply for expositional purposes; an actual 'break date' is chosen in a later section of the paper. 
is, either seasonal pressures, fueled by agriculture and popularized by Kemmerer (1910), did not exist prior to this 
time or seasonal strains were present, but sterilized by some sort of monetary intervention (centrally planned or 
otherwise). The second explanation links the presence of volatility with the absence of seasonality. That is, 
seasonal strains were present, but had no discernable effect on money markets prior to this time due to interest rate 
volatility. 
The first explanation is not plausible. The existence of seasonal strains, imparted on US credit markets by 
the agricultural cycle, is documented in the literature.9 Moreover, the smoothing of interest rates over a period of 
four decades is highly unlikely in the absence of a central monetary authority. Finally, this explanation requires that 
antebellum seasonal patterns mimic their post-1914 counterparts (figure 2.c.), which they clearly do not do. 10 We 
propose that the second explanation is most appropriate. Namely, the inability to detect a seasonal cycle prior to the 
late l 800's is due to money market volatility. That is, although the annual process of planting, harvesting and 
moving crops occurred at similar times throughout each year, market volatility obscured the seasonal cycle. 
Moreover, we associate the quelling of money market volatility with the evolution of commodity futures contracts. 
But, before expounding on this point, the date at which volatility diminished sufficiently, and a regular seasonal 
component emerged, must be established. 
5. A Regime Switch in the 19th Century 
In this section, the most likely date at which a break in interest rate variability occurred is estimated. To 
obtain a continuous data set, we restrict our analysis in this section to Macaulay's commercial paper rate (1836-
1933). 11 To estimate the time at which a break occurred in short-term rate behavior, we use the maximum 
likelihood technique developed by Goldfeld and Quandt (l 973) and employed in Mankiw, et. al. (1987) to detect the 
break in 1914. In particular, the short-term interest rate is modeled as the following: 
t= 1,2, ... ,T,-2,Ts-l 
t=Ts,Ts+l,···,T (4) 
where o and n denote old and new regimes, respectively; is the first period of the new regime. The error terms on 
the two regression equations, namely n1+ 1 old and new, are assumed to be distributed N(O,s/) and N(O,s/) 
9 Sec Chandler (1977), Friedman and Schwartz (1963), Jcvons (1884), and Kemmerer (1910). 
10 Although timely, we believe the estahlishment of the National Banking System in 1863, and the concomitant extinction of state banks of issue 
is irrelevant to this discussion. First, as Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue, the growing importance of deposits in the 1860s, coupled with 
relatively less austere stale banking regulation, lead to a rapid expansion in the number and deposits of state banks by l87l. Indeed, the deposits 
of state banks roughly equaled those of their national counterparts by this time. 
respectively, while (a0,b0 , �ns) and (an,bn , �os ) are the regression coefficients calculated using OLS; specifically, 
a, b and � are the constant term, autoregressive term and seasonal dummy coefficients, respectively. Given these 
assumptions, the break date can be estimated by maximizing the likelihood function conditional on Ts. 12 
In this model a break in short-term interest rates implies a change in either the regression coefficients 
specified in (4) or the population variance a- 2 . But, given that the autoregressive term included in (4) is both mean 
reverting and significant throughout the sample, and seasonal pressures existed throughout the entire nineteenth 
century, we identify a break in the series as a shift in its population variance, a- 2 . 
Results indicate a change in variance occurred near November, 1873. 13 That is, US short-term interest rates 
began to exhibit a statistically significant seasonal component around this time due to diminished volatility. Indeed, 
the variance of this series is larger before this date than after by a statistically significant factor of 7 .1 14 
Hence the findings thus far suggest that prior to 1874, movements in interest rates were erratic and 
financial instabilities imparted relatively large shocks to money markets, particularly in the autumn months. After 
1874, the effects of financial instabilities on interest rates diminished and the regularization of seasonal movements 
was attained. We attribute this change in behavior of short-term rates in the nineteenth century to the introduction of 
futures markets and the resulting substitution away from consignment contracts in the agricultural trade shortly after 
1874. 
6. The Financing and Marketing of Grain and Cotton Before the 1870's 
Prior to the 1870' s, the US grain trade was financed through a network of producers, purchasing agents, 
commission houses, and produce dealers. Producers, including farmers, millers and local merchants, were situated 
in the western-most portion of the network while the dealers, who purchased grain, were situated primarily in the 
East. Purchasing agents and commission houses, located in Buffalo, New York and Liverpool, bridged western 
production and eastern consumption with the financial resources necessary to facilitate trade. 15 
11 These data consist of antebellum Boston from 1836-1859 and the New York commercial Paper rate from 1860-1933. 
12 The break date can be estimated by maximizing the following likelihood function conditional on T,: 
,,, -( 1 )i ,, 1n,1 { 1 ,, , I ' 
'} 
L(rll,)
2TI 
<I,, <I
,, 
exp -z'Z:(r,-x,P,,) -2' Z:(r,-x,/1,,) a-,, ,�1 C,n tcT,•l 
This is done by first calculating the maximum likelihood estimates for the parameters in the model and then choosing the T, which has the 
greatest likelihood. While this methodology allows for heteroscedasticity across the two subsamples, it assumes that the innovation variance is 
constant within each subsample. That is, the model specifics constant heteroscedasticity. In addition, the error term is assumed pure white noise 
and hence autocorrelated errors arc not considered. Based on an examination of residuals of the differenced data, these assumptions seem 
appropriate. 
11 Indeed, the standard error of the estimate from (4) fell from 2.08 between 1836 and 1873 to only .57 between 1874 and I 910. 
14 F-test 7.13, F-critical 1.69 with nl=432, 112=456. 
15 Rothstein, M., "The International Market for Agricultural Commodities, 1850-1873." p. 65. 
The most common method of financing the grain trade was where a producer offered h is harvest to 
purchasing agents who in tum sold the grain to commission houses in the East. From there, the grain was sold to 
either a final purchaser or another commission house. In a l l  cases, the final purchaser and the final purchase price 
was unknown at the point of production. For this reason, agents and commission houses at each stage of the process 
attempted to reduce their exposure to price risk during crop movements by operating on a consignment basis. That 
is, rather than purchase the grain outright from the fanner, and hence risk any price fluctuations until the grain could 
be sold, agents did not take ownership of the grain, effectively acting on behalf of the fanners . 16 According to 
Rothstein ( 1 966), this approach l inked fanners, agents and commission houses such that the "entire procedure was 
attended by considerable risk and speculation, which was assumed by both the consignee and consignor." 1
7 
7. Changes in the Financing and Marketing of Grain and Cotton in the 1870's 
Storage and shipment technologies such as grain elevators and rai lroads became avai lable in the I 850's .  
Because these implements required that staples be stored and transported in bulk, shipments could no longer be 
tagged according to farmer or region. Moreover, due to the high volume of transports, purchasers were unable to 
inspect and choose their bundles upon delivery. This presented a problem in  the East because produce agents often 
gauged the quality (and hence price) of a staple on the basis of such infonnation and inspections . 18 Hence, a 
nationally accepted system of grading and standardizing staples was required. 
In the 1 850's, grain exchanges emerged, and their roles included weighing, inspecting and classifying each 
commodity shipment. 19 Establ ished in 1 848, the Chicago Board of Trade began this practice in the late 1 850's .20 
St. Louis and Buffalo exchanges adopted similar methods in 1 854. Like the grain industry, cotton exchanges would 
grade, standardize and i nspect cotton. The first US cotton exchange formed in New York one year after the 
L iverpool Cotton Brokers Association in 1 869, while a 'complete' network of grading and standardizing was not in 
11
' Rothstein, M .• "The International Market for Agricultural Commodities, 1 850-1 873." p. 1 20.  
1 7  Ib id . ,  p. 1 20. The financing of the cotton trade was somewhat different. Although credit systems played a role i n  Southern agriculture since 
Colonial t imes, the network of intermediaries differed from that of the grain trade. In particular, factors were the principle lenders of funds for 
the purchase of agricultural inputs, and served as both purchasing agents and intermediaries for large Southern pl anters and Nonhern and 
European money-lenders. The method of credit extension from year to year was such that current credit was provided on the basis of future crop 
production. Liens were often placed on future harvests when current production proved insufficient to pay outstanding credit balances. 
However, after the Civil War, factors frequently lacked the funds to make advances to farmers and hence were forced to seek advances from 
commission houses i n  the North and i n  Europe. A system similar to that in the West evolved such that large commission houses dealt with 
correspondents in Liverpool, and factors became the local agents (receivers) within the hinterland [See Rothstein ( 1966)]. 
'
8 Rothstein, M., "The International Market for Agricultural Commodities, 1 850-1 873," p. 12 I .  
• •  Chandler, A.O., The Visible Hand, p .  2 1  L 
20 Regarding the grain trade around 1 848, a 1 936 Chicago Board of Trade Bulletin writes, "A bushel of wheat was measured in a ba,ket leveled 
off on top with a stick . . .  Warehouses were of the flat type and of l imited capacity . . .  Future contracts as we know them today were unknown." 
place until 1 874.2 1  The East, and the New York Produce Exchange in particu lar, accepted the methods of grading 
used in the West and South as a national standard at this time.22 This complete network made business 
communication easier and less subject to expensive arbitration.23 Speaking about the late 1 840's, a Chicago Board 
of Trade bul letin adds, 
"Without standard weights per bushel, there was opportunity for shady practices in measuring quantity, and 
because of lack of standard grades the matter of quality was often the basis for altercation and bitter dispute 
between buyer and seller. Lacking adequate storage facil ities and with no contracts other than the 
warehouse receipt, there was much speculation in both cash grain and warehouse receipts. Violent price 
fluctuations were frequent as deliveries were either greater than the need for immediate shipment or less 
than was required to load the waiting ships for movement East."24 
In addition, a national system of grading standards al lowed for the use of 'to arrive ' or futures contracts. A 
futures contract stipulated the quality, amount, price and (a future) delivery date of a staple; the staple was 
purchased in cash upon delivery. High volume futures contracting required the standardization of staples because 
contracts were made before the deliverable  was harvested. Hence, both parties to the contract had to agree on the 
quality of the deliverable before it was exchanged. Not until the 1 870's was the language used to define such 
'quality' accepted generally by all parties involved, including the conservative business community in the East.25 
Indeed, Irwin ( 1 954) notes that, 
After 1 856 it appears that the use of time contracts in grain marketing increased at a moderate rate for 
several years. They then received a great stimulus from the activity in the grain trade which [sic] resulted 
from the Civil War. Their growth and development continued until they ripened into organized trading in 
grain futures, perhaps early in the 1 870s.26 
Futures trading also required a technological infrastructure capable of communicating prices across 
markets, nationally and internationally, in a timely fashion.27 The telegraph provided this service.28 Perfected in 
1 837, the telegraph shaped the commodity exchanges some thi rty to forty years l ater by allowing prices in the East 
to be communicated to the South and West, al lowing grain and cotton to be purchased before harvest or while the 
goods were in transit.29 In summary, some form of futures trading existed prior to the Civil War, however, 
innovations in staple standardization, transportation and communications developed such that futures trading 
21 Rothstein, M., "The International Market for Agricul tural Commodities, 1 850- 1 873." p .  2 1 3 .  22 Chandler, A.D., The Visible Hand, p .  2 1 1 .  
23 Rothstein, M. ,  "The International Market for Agricultural Commodities. 1 850-1 873," p. 67. 
24 The Chicago Board of Trade, "The Development of the Chicago Board of Trade" p . 1 2 . 25 Chandler. A. D., The Visible Hand, p. 2 1 4. 2'' Irwin, Harol d  S. Evolut.�on of Futures TnidJ_!!g, p. 77-8. 27 Nonetheless, futures trad ing took place before such technological infrastructures became available. Rothstein ( 1 965) explains that regular mail 
service by "fast boats" enabled British grain importers in the 1 840's to send ahead samples of a staple which was still in transit. Merchants on the 
floor of London Ts Baltic Exchange entered into buy and sell contracts on the "to arrive'" staple based on inspection of these samples. 
" Rothstein, M., 'The International Market for Agricultural Commodities, 1 850-1 873," p .  67. 
19 Chandler, A.O., The Visible Hand, p. 2 1 4 . 
1 0  
became fully operational around 1 874.30 On the size of futures markets around the late 1 870s, the Board of Trade 
noted, 
For at least ten years after it had been transacted by the members of the Board of Trade, and during the 
[Civil] war, this business had grown to immense proportions, at times establ ishing a price on grain and 
provision throughout the civi lized world. But until the adoption of these [ 1 865 trading] rules, defining the 
rights of parties under contract for future delivery, the Board had no adequate machinery for adjustment of 
d isputes which [sic] were constantly arising.3 1  
8.  The Effect of Futures Markets on US Money Market Volatility: A Model32 
Futures markets quelled money market volatility via hedging, a risk-transferring scheme practiced by 
producers, shippers and speculators.33 Indeed, Chandler writes that traders began to hedge their portfol ios 
"immediately" following the introduction of the modern (post 1 874) futures contract.34 Moreover, on this matter the 
Chi cago Board of Trade observed, "Merchants and transportation interests were using the futures market to insure 
delivery of grain when and where it was needed and at a known price which permitted safeguarding of handling 
charges, a practice today [ 1936] known as 'hedging."35 The notion that hedging transfers price risk, or the volatility 
of an asset's cash market price, from staple producers and shippers to speculators, thus immunizing the portfol io of 
the former from the volatility of cash market prices, has been suggested, both anecdotally and theoretically by 
several authors [See Clark ( 1 966), Chandler ( 1 977), Chari and Jagannathan (1 990), Kawai ( 1 983), Morgan, Rayner 
and Ennew ( 1 994), Tumovsky ( 1 983) and Tumovsky and Campbell ( 1 985). However, the effect of futures markets 
on the variance of interest rates remains both unclear and relatively uninvestigated. 
That futures markets quell rate volati l ity is shown below using the standard mean-variance framework of 
the spot price volatility l iterature [See Chari, Jagannathan, and Jones ( 1 990), Kawai ( 1 983), Tumovsky ( 1 983), and 
Tumovsky and Campbell ( 1 985)]. In similar fashion, this paper builds upon the optimizing behaviors of producers 
and speculators in the absence and presence of futures contracts in order to expound on the effect of commodity 
futures on interest rates, rather than prices. ln general, results indicate that the ability to hedge in the futures markets 
increases the price sensitivities of aggregate supply and aggregate demand, thereby dim inishing the variabi l ity of 
both the price level and the interest rate in the presence of supply and/or demand shocks. 
To begin, we assume that output is produced by a perfectly competitive representative firm facing the profit 
30 Rothstein, M ., "The International Market for Agricultural Commodities, 1 850-1 873," p. 72. 11 The Chicago Board of Trade, "The Development of the Chicago Board of Trade" p. 1 8. 12 See appendix I for derivation details. 
33 In the parlance of modern finance, a 'perfect' or ' textbook' hedge was attained if the basis, defined as difference between cash and future 
prices, remained constant throughout the period for which the hedge was employed. 
" Chandler, A.D., The Vi�ible Hand, p. 2 1 2 .  
1 1  
function specified in  ( I ), where costs are quadratic in the level of planned, rather than actual, output Y, . I n  the 
presence of a futures market for commodity Yi , p lanters in period t- 1 may choose to engage in a hedge, thereby 
committing themselves to deliver z/1 units of output in period t, at a (futures) price �� 1 specified in period t- 1 .  The 
term ¢ in ( l )  is a b inary variable denoting the presence (¢ 1) or absence (¢ 0) of a futures market. That costs are 
incurred on p lanned rather than actual output is appropriate since firms (planters) expend resources based upon ex 
ante growing objectives rather than ex post yields. 
1 -2 
-cY, 
2 
( ] ) 
Actual output, given by (2), is equal to planned output plus a random disturbance term v1 -, N(0,1 )  representing 
natural (supply) shocks to each period's output. 
(2) 
Substituting (2) into ( 1 )  yields the profit function specified in (3 ), 
(3) 
Following Tumovsky ( 1 983 ), the representative firm is assumed to be risk averse, concerned with both the level and 
variability of profits, and hence maximizes the following objective function (4).36 
(4) 
The role played by the coefficient alpha, a term that captures the relative risk aversion of the representative 
producer, will be discussed in detail below. 37 In the absence of futures markets (¢ = 0) , the representative firm 
m aximizes A 1 with respect to Y, , yielding, 
E,-1 [P, ]- a COV H [P, , Plvl ] 
c + a var1_1 [P,] 
(5) 
While in the presence of futures markets (¢ = I ) , the representative firm maximizes A 1 , with respect to Y1 and 
Solving simultaneously yields, 
.1; The Chicago Board of Trade, ''The Development of the Chicago Board of Trade" p. 1 6 . 
3" Tumovsky, Stephen J. "The Determination of Spot and Future Prices With Storable Commodities," p . 1 363. 
17  Simon, Herbert A. "Dynamic Programming L:nder Uncertainty With a Quadratic Criterion Function," p.74. 
1 2  
(6) 
(7) 
In addition to producers, this model considers also the behavior of risk neutral speculators who store 
commodity Yi and hold long and short positions X (1 in the futures markets in anticipation of favorable spot and 
futures price movements, respectively. The profit function of the representative speculator (8) is comprised of: ( i) 
storage revenues, where J,_1 is the quantity of i nventory held over from period t- 1 ;  ( i i) futures market transaction 
revenues, where xiCi is the speculator's quantity of long (xL < 0 )or short (xiCi > 0 )positions in the futures 
markets; and ( i i i )  quadratic storage costs.38 
(8) 
Once again, following Turnovsky ( 1 983 ), the representative speculator is risk neutral and m aximizes the following 
objective function (9).39 The coefficient beta captures the relative risk aversion of the representative speculator. 
., [ "" ] I [ s] A1 = E1-1 n:1 - 2 P var1 -1 n:1 (9) 
In the absence of futures markets (� 0) , the representative speculator sets the expected marginal return on 
inventory storage dA1 equal to R1- 1 , the return on a financial asset representing the opportunity costs of storing dl1-1 
commodities [See Bond ( 1 984)), yielding, 
[ _ Et-I [P, ]- P,_1 - RI-I t-l - d + pvar1-1 [P, ] 
Meanwhi le, i n  the presence of futures markets (� 
respect to 11_1 and X1 _1 • Once again, setting dlt-1 
11-J = - ----d 
( 1 0) 
1) , the representative speculator totally differentiates A1 , with 
= R1 and 
dAi = 0 ,  and solving simultaneously y ields, 
dXt-1 
( 1 1 ) 
( 1 2) 
" Similar specifications can be found in Bond ( 1984), Kawai ( 1 983), Turnovsky ( 1 983) and Turnovsky and Campbell ( 1 985). 
J9 Turnovsky, Stephen J. 'The Determination of Spot and Future Prices With Storable Commodities," p. 1 363. 
Following Turnovsky and Campbell ( 1 985), we assume that the current spot price, P, , deviates from its expected 
value by the weighted sum of the aggregate demand and supply disturbances, respectively. yielding the following 
aggregate supply in the absence of futures markets, 
AS 
[ ] fi = bE,_1 P, + v1 
where 
apu var,_ 1 [v, ] 
c + a var1-1 [Pi] 
Likewise, in the presence of futures markets, aggregate supply is simply 
YAS I pf I t-1 + VI 
( 1 3) 
( 1 4) 
Lastly, in both the absence and presence of futures markets, the following specifications are employed for 
consumption and money demand respectively. 
c, ' ; E (O,I) 
M lJ = Ke 111, P1 ' l < 0 40 
The money demand equation is transfonned logarithmically (denoted by lower case), and a l inear 
1 3  
approximation of the expression In P, is taken around P0 , yielding, m
D = k + (In P0 
l l ) + IR, + 
Po 
. Hence, in the 
absence of futures markets, a demand-side equilibrium is established in the goods and money markets by solving 
( 1 5) simultaneously, where real investment expenditure is given from ( 1 1  ) ;  u, is a zero mean and finite variance 
demand shock. 
c1 + i1 + u1 = y, goods market 
Md = Ms money market 
Demand-side equil ibrium yields the following aggregate demand function, 
AD : Y, = -B!.!_ (m - k - Po + l ) + By1 E, [P,+i ) - By1rv?i + Bu, 
I 
where co ( 1 - -
1-) dY, j < O. 
dY, > O 
IP
0 ' dP, An · dm 
( 1 5) 
( 1 6) 
Finally, the aggregate equilibrium condition ( 1 7) is derived, where aggregate demand is set equal to current output 
"' As seen originally in Cagan (1956). 
plus inventory holdings carried over from the prior period. 
AS Y, + 1,- 1  ( 1 7) 
where, 
G' 2 
From ( 1 7), the one period and asymptotic variances of interest rates fol low as a J ( 1 )  = 2 
17 
2 , and (lP0 ) (or(w - J.i )) 
14  
Likewise, in the presence of  futures markets, a demand-side equilibrium i s  established i n  the goods, money 
and futures markets simultaneously ( 1 8) .  
c, + i1 + u1 y1 goods market 
M d Ms money market 
zl + xf = 0 .futures market 1-1 1-1 
Demand-side equilibrium yields the following aggregate demand function, 
( 1 8) 
AD : Yi (m - k - p0 + 1) [ 
I ) 0 F21 [ ] O [[ I J ] 0 . -- - 1 + -- E P 1 + - -- - 1 w P + Ou  Id F d d F: I I+  d d I I 1 1 1 ,  
1 1 
+ - +  
c d 
dYi I 
dYi and - AD < 0, - > 0  
dPi dm 
Once again, the aggregate equilibrium condition ( 1 9) is derived, where aggregate demand is set equal to current 
output plus investory holdings carried over from the prior period. 
where, 
AS 
Y, + v, 
( 1 9) 
From ( I 9), the one period and asymptotic variances of interest rates follow as 
-------�- ----- , respectively. 
0Po )2 (1 ,1 {!((1 - ;,d} 
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Due to the model ' s  non-l inear strueture, an arithmetie comparison of variances in the presence, and 
absence, of futures markets is not tractable, hence a simulation approach i s  adopted to expound the effects of futures 
markets on money market volatility.41  While both systems of equations (w/ & wlo futures) require nine parameters: 
B, M, k, P
0
, c, d, l, a and f3 ,  only changes in the values of the latter five are germane to the hypothesis at hand; 
these are, c, d, l, a and f3 ,  or produeer's cost elasticity, speculator's return (on inventory) elasticity, interest rate 
elasticity of money demand, producer's relative risk aversion and speculator's relative risk aversion, respectively.42 
The following two plates il lustrate the effects of changes in c, d, a and J3 ,  for an interest rate elasticity of money 
demand, l ,  equal to -.9, in the presence of supply and demand shocks, respectively.43 The results that follow were 
produced using a nonl inear systems-solving algorithm avai lable through SAS. 
Several simulation results are worth noting. Namely, futures markets quell interest rate volati l ity most 
effectively when: ( 1 )  producers and speculators are relatively risk-averse (relatively high a and f3 ) ; (2) shocks 
emanate from the demand, as opposed to the supply, side of an economy; (3) an economy's aggregate demand and 
supply curves are relatively inelastic (relatively small c and large d ); and ( 4) interest rate sensitivity of money 
demand i s  relatively large. Lastly, the effect of futures markets on the mean level of the interest rate is ambiguous. 
In general, the intuition for why futures markets quell money market volatil ity is as follows: futures 
markets increase the relative sensitivities of producers and specu lators to antic ipated fluctuations in the price level, 
causing each to behave in a manner that offsets partially any potential movement in the price level. As movements 
in the price level are offset, so too are fluctuations in the real money supply, hence interest rate movements are 
offset as wel l .  This can be seen for speculators by comparing investment decisions in the absence, and presence, of 
futures markets ( ( 10) and ( 1 1 ), respectively). In the absence of futures markets a rise in the variance of the price 
level weakens a speculator's investment sensitivity to anticipated price increases (by a mu ltiple of the latter's 
coefficient of relative risk aversion). For example, without the avai labil ity of a futures contract in  which to engage, 
a speculator is less likely to sell inventories as prices rise, hence prices rise, and interest rates fall, by more than they 
otherwise would. On the contrary, price volati l ity plays no direct role in a speculator ' s  inventory decision in the 
presence of futures contracts. On th is point, the Chicago Board of Trade notes, 
41 SAS' Model procedure is used to solve these nonl inear systems. 
42 While the variance of the interest rate is dependent upon a given value of Po, the relative magnitudes of these variances, in the presence and 
absence of futures contracts are not. 
41 Interest rate volatil ity is relatively less in the presence of futures contracts. the greater the absolute value of interest rate sensitivity of money 
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The speculator was present to absorb, as a "long," offerings that could not otherwise be read i ly taken by 
the trade, or to supply contracts during times of high prices and small deliveries by going "short." . . .  Even 
at this early date [ 1 850- 1 860] the inherent speculative risk in taking title to grain for merchandising 
purposes was being passed on to the speculator who desired to assume this risk in the hope of profit.44 
Likewise, producers are more apt to increase production in anticipation of a price rise, when a futures contract is 
available, hence mitigating partially a price rise in the next period. Once again ,  a comparison of supply functions in 
the absence, and presence, of futures contracts ((5) and (6), respectively) i l lustrates this point. 
The intuition regarding the remaining simulation results (enumerated above) is as follows: first the greater 
the relative risk aversions of producers and speculators, the less their actions accommodate price movements in the 
absence of futures contracts, so futures markets are relatively more stabil izing; second, unlike the demand-side, the 
supply-side is able to employ both inventory (speculators) and production (producers) responses to a potential 
change in the price level, so demand shocks are relatively better accommodated with and without futures contracts; 
third, s ince futures markets increase price-sensitivities of both aggregate supply and demand schedules, the effect of 
this increased sensitivity is relatively more pronounced when these functions are relatively insensitive prior to the 
introduction of such contracts; lastly, the explanation for the role that the interest rate elasticity of money demand 
plays in quell ing interest rate volatility is the same as that provided by the standard LM relationship. 
Hence, futures contracts insulated traders from the annual fluctuations in staple prices caused by variations 
in planting and harvesting conditions. As a result. when traders borrowed from the money market to purchase these 
staples, the amount of cash that they required (demanded) was also relatively insulated from stap le price volatility. 
Hence, while real shocks continued to hit agricultural markets after 1 874, the demand and supply for loanable funds 
remained relatively unaffected. Therefore, money markets were less inclined to react to real shocks and hence the 
volatil ity in the annual cost of borrowing decreased. Chandler notes that this financial innovation "lowered the cost 
of credit required to move crops" such that relatively low-interest short-term credit was easi ly obtained by shippers 
from local commercial banks as the risk associated with such loans diminished.45 As a result, interest rate volatil ity 
decreased, and a statistically significant seasonal pattern is discernable after 1 874. 
demand, I . To conserve space, only results for I =-.9 are reported here. 
"The Chicago Board of Trade, ''The Development of the Ch icago Board of Trade" p . 1 6. Interestingly, this publication also notes that " i t  i s  
clearly evident that the stabilizing influence and price registration functions ofa  futures market were in use almost from the  organization of the 
Board of Trade in 1 848. and were not an outgrowth of the Civil War as is popularly believed (emphasis added)." 
" Chandler, A.O._ The Visible Hand, p. 2 1 2. 
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Plate l .a . :  Simulation Results, l = -.9 , i n  the Presence of Supply Shocks 
Parameter Sets 
1 I 2 I 3 I 4 I 5 I 6 I 7 I 8 c 0 .200 0.200 0.200 0.200 5 .000 5 .000 5 .000 5 .000 
D 5 .000 5 .000 5 .000 5 .000 0.200 0.200 0.200 0.200 
a 0. 1 00 0.0 1 0  0 . 1 00 0.0 1 0  0. 1 00 0.0 1 0  0. 1 00 0.0 1 0  
13 0. 1 00 0. 1 00 0.0 1 0  0.0 1 0  0. 1 00 0 . 1 00 0.0 1 0  0 .0 1 0  
I I 
2 
I 
3 
I 
4 
I 
5 
I 
6 
I 
7 
I 
8 
(]'2 
R nof11111res 3 .966 3 .727 3 . 54 1  3 .360 0.0 1 0  0 .0 1 0  0.0 1 0  0.0 1 0  
(]'2 
R futures 3 .305 3 .302 3 .3 02 3 .302 0.0 1 0  0 .0 1 0  0.0 1 0  0 .0 1 0  
O" 11 fi,tures 0.833 0 .890 0.933 0.983 1 .000 0.993 1 .00 1 1 .000 {J" 2 
R no ftlturo,� 
R no(i1111res 1 1 .683 1 1 .939 1 1 .689 1 1 .928 0.83 1 0.825 0.828 0 .822 
R .fi,tures 1 1 .534 1 1 . 870 1 1 . 870 1 1 .908 0.783 0 .8 1 4  0 .8 1 4  0 .8 1 7  
R f11111res 
0.987 0.994 1 .0 1 6  0.998 0.942 0.987 0.983 0 .994 
R II() futures 
cvfwures 0 . 1 5 8 0 . 1 53 0 . 1 53 0 . 1 53 0. 1 3 1  0 . 1 25 0. 1 25 0 . 1 25 
c v,,() .fi1t11res 0 . 1 70 0 . 1 62 0 . 1 6 1  0. 1 54 0 . 1 23 0 . 1 24 0 . 1 23 0 . 1 24 
Plate l .b.: Simulation Results, l = -.9 ,  in the Presence of Demand Shocks 
Parameter Sets 
c 
D 
a 
13 
0' 2 
R no futures 
0' 2 
R fwure., 
R nofutures 
R .futures 
R no futures 
cvfuture., 
Jitlures 
1 
0.200 
5.000 
0. 1 00 
0. 1 00 
1 2.970 
7.437 
0.573 
1 0.963 
1 0.987 
1 .002 
0.248 
0.329 
I 2 I 3 
0.200 0.200 
5.000 5.000 
0.0 1 0  0. 1 00 
0. 1 00 0.0 1 0  
2 3 
1 0.22 1 8.945 
7.430 7.430 
0.727 0.831 
1 1 .901 1 1 .098 
1 1 .754 1 1 .754 
0.988 1 .059 
0.232 0.232 
0.269 0.269 
I 4 I 5 I 6 I 7 
0.200 5.000 5.000 5.000 
5.000 0.200 0.200 0.200 
0.0 1 0  0. 1 00 0.0 1 0  0. 1 00 
0.0 1 0 0. 1 00 0.1 00 0.0 1 0  
4 5 6 7 
7.751 0.024 0.024 0.023 
7.429 0.024 0.023 0.023 
0.958 0.990 0.983 1 .000 
1 1 .880 0.828 0.828 0.82 1 
1 1 .844 0.826 0.822 0.822 
0.997 0.998 0.992 1 .00 1 
0.230 0. 1 86 0. 1 86 0. 1 86 
0.234 0. 1 86 0. 1 86 0. 1 86 
I 8 
5.000 
0.200 
0.0 1 0  
0.0 1 0  
8 
0.023 
0.023 
0.999 
0.822 
0.82 1 
1 .000 
0. 1 86 
0. 1 86 
However, that the futures contract did not eradicate seasonal patterns in interest rates must be noted. 
1 8  
Borrowing increased during the harvest and crop moving seasons regardless of whether or not a futures contract was 
employed. For example, in the presence of futures contracts: wheat was purchased in September, wheat prices 
fluctuated in September, transactions were still settled in cash, and if the long position required a loan to purchase 
wheat, that loan was acquired in September. The only difference was that traders were certain about the price they 
would pay in the market for the staple. In the context of this example, the demand for money increased every 
September j ust as it did prior to the existence of futures markets. Likewise, if the September harvest was poor, 
staple prices rose accordingly. Hence, the annual movements in the marketing of wheat remained seasonal while the 
volatility of staple prices, and interest rates, did diminished as the transfer of price risk from traders to speculators 
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quelled money market volatility. 46 This led to a decrease in the variance of interest rates and hence statistically 
significant seasonality was introduced into US money markets. 
Lastly, an additional explanation for the decrease in money market volatility around 1874 is the substitution 
of futures for consignment contracts.47 Regarding the abandonment of consignment contracts (and adoption of 
futures contracts) after 1874, Chandler writes, "No longer did the financing of the movement of the crops require 
long and often risky negotiations between one commission merchant and another."48 Once futures markets were 
fully operational, the crowding out of the consignment contract was immediate.49 
Negotiations based on consignment were inherently risky because none of the parties involved purchased 
the produce from the farmers, millers and merchants at the point of production. Rather, the owners of the produce 
were compensated upon the execution of a final sale in the East. Prior to this sale, traders at every level of the 
marketing process were unaware of the price that they would pay or receive for the produce. Regardless of the 
motive, contracts made on consignment and financed with short-tem1 credit tied money markets to the volatility of 
staple prices. This occurred because a sudden change in price would unexpectedly affect the financial positions of 
borrowers and lenders. This would lead to relatively large fluctuations in interest rates. 
The design of a futures contract was opposite that of a consignment contract. By generally adopting the 
former in 1874, players in the agricultural trade could choose between business transactions of varying risk. For the 
conservative business-person wishing to purchase staples from the West, a futures contract and a hedging scheme 
was the ideal combination for guarding oneself against price risk. Likewise, for the speculator, schemes such as 
selling staples short in anticipation of a price decrease or taking a long position in anticipation of a price increase 
enabled quick gains (and losses) to be made. 
In summary, the emergence of futures markets, in conjunction with hedging techniques and the eradication 
of consignment contracts .. could explain the decrease in interest rate volatility observed after 1874 and the 
subsequent emergence of statistically significant seasonality. In addition, this explanation is consistent with the 
observed seasonal patterns in US short-term interest rates throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries. 
"" Indeed, Chandler(l 977) states that such price volatility diminished with the advent of futures contracts. 
" Chandler, A.D., The Visible Hand, p. 211. 
'
8 Ibid., p. 2 12. 
-----·---
•'' See Chandler (1977). Clark (1966). and Hammond (1897). 
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8. Conclusion 
This paper linked the change in the behavior of US short-tenn interest rates around 1 874 with the evolution 
of commodity futures contracts. In particular, the introduction of futures markets, and the resulting substitution 
away from consignment contracts around 1 874, was used to explain why early US money markets are relatively 
more volatile, and far less seasonal, than their post- 1 874 counterparts. The paper argued that the inabi l ity to detect a 
seasonal cycl e  prior to the l 870's was most likely due to money market volatility. Until 1 874, movements in 
interest rates were erratic and financial instabil ities imparted relatively large shocks to money markets, particularly 
in the autumn months. After 1 874, the effects of financial instabilities on interest rates dimin ished and the 
regularization of seasonal movements was attained. 
That futures trading quel led money market volatility was demonstrated using the standard mean-variance 
framework of the spot price volatility literature. The paper built upon the optimizing behaviors of producers and 
speculators in the absence and presence of futures contracts. Results indicated that the abi l ity to hedge in the futures 
markets increases the price sensitivities of aggregate supply and aggregate demand, thereby diminish ing the 
variabi l ity of both the price level and the interest rate in the presence of supply and/or demand shocks. 
Appendix 1 .  The Model 
The Producer's Problem 
1rf' P, [r; - ¢z£1 ]+ P,!1¢Z£1 2 
Y, + v, , E,_1 [v1 ] 0, E,_, [v/ ] = a� 
Substituting (2) into ( I )  yields (3), 
I -2 -cY,  
2 
( ] ) 
(2) 
(3) 
2 1  
Following Turnovsky ( 1 983), the representative firm i s  assumed to be risk averse, concerned with both the level and 
variability of profits, and hence maximizes the following objective function (4). 
Ap _ , - [nf' l-ia Valj_J [nf ] 
where, 
E,_, [1rf ]= [P, fr, - ¢z,_, ) + [P, , P, v, ] +  P,!1¢Z,_1 
var1_1 [1rf ]= varH [P, KY, - ¢Z,_1 )2 + var,_1 [P, v1 ] +  2(Y1 
(4) 
¢Z1_ 1 ) covH [P, , P,v, ]  
I n  the absence of futures markets (¢ = 0) , the representative firm maximizes A, with respect to Y , ,  yie lding, 
Y, = E,
_1 [P, ] - a cov t-) [P, , P, v, J 
c + a var,_1 [P, ] 
(5) 
Whi le in the presence of futures markets (¢ = I) ,  the representative firm maximizes A, , with respect to Y ,  and Z1_1 • 
Solving simultaneously yields, 
- pf 
Y , = -1-_I 
P,�1 E1-1 [P, ]+ a cOV 1-1 [P, , P, v, ] P/1 ------------ + - -
a var,_1 [P, ] c 
The Speculator's Problem 
n;' = 11-1 (P1 P,_1 ) + ¢X,-1 (P,!, - P, ) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
Once again, fol lowing Turnovsky ( 1 983), the representative speculator i s  risk neutral and maximizes the fol lowing 
objective function (9). 
(9) 
where, 
E,_1 [n;' ] = J,_ 1 (E,_1 [P, ] - PH )+ ¢X 1_1 (P,!1 
var,-1 [1r;' ]=  U1-1 ¢X1-1 )2 var,-1 [P, ]  
22 
In the absence of futures markets (¢ = 0) , the representative speculator total ly differentiates A 1 with respect to 11_1 ,  
and, borrowing from Bond ( 1 984 ), sets the expected marginal return on inventory storage dA, equal to R,_ 1 , the dl,_1 
return on a financial asset representing the opportun ity costs of storing commodities, which yields, 
I _ E1-1 [P, 
]- P,_1 - R,-1 
I I -
[ ] 
-
d + /3 var1-1 P, 
( 10) 
Whi le  in the presence of futures markets (¢ = I) , the representative speculator totally differentiates A 1 , with respect 
d O 
. . dA, to 11_1 an X1_1 • nee agam, settmg - -
d/1_1 
1, .1 d 
x,_1 = P,�
1 E[fi ] 
/3 var,_ 1 [P, ] 
dA1 R1 , - - 0 and solving simultaneously y ields, 
dX,_1 
( 1 1 )  
( 12) 
Following Turnovsky and Campbel l  ( 1 985), we assume that the current spot price, P, , deviates from its expected 
value by the weighted sum of the aggregate demand and supply disturbances, respectively: 
( 1 3) 
where, 
[ui } = £,_1 [vJ O 
£,_ 1 [u; ] =  a-,; ; E1-1 [v? ]= a� 
and Pu , Pv represent the responses of the spot price to aggregate demand and aggregate supply disturbances, 
respectively.50 Hence, 
( 1 4) 
Lastly, substituting ( 1 4) into (5) yields the following aggregate supply in the absence of futures markets, 
where 
bi = 
1 - apv var1_1 [v1 ] 
c + a var,_1 [P, ] 
Likewise, in the presence of futures markets, aggregate supply is simply 
( 1 5) 
( 1 6) 
50 Turnovsky, Stephen J. and Robert B. Campbell. 'The Stabilizing and Welfare Properties of Futures Markets: A Simulation Approach." p. 282. 
Finally, in both the absence and presence of futures markets, the following spec ifications are employed for 
consumption and money demand respectively. 
Cl , r; E (Q,J) 
M D K/R, Pi , I < 0 
23 
The money demand equation is transformed logarithmically (denoted by lower case), and a linear approximation of 
the expression In Pi is taken around P0 , yielding, mn = k + (In P0 - 1 ) +  IR1 + 
1 Pi .  
Po 
In the absence of futures markets, a demand-side equilibrium is established in the goods and money 
markets by solving ( 1 7) simultaneously, where real investment expenditure is given from ( 1 1 ); u1 is a zero mean and 
finite variance demand shock. 
C, + 11 + u, = Y, goods market 
M /> = M s money market 
where 
C1 r;Y, , <; E (O,I ) 
M '  
r1 (E,_1 [P, ]- P,_1 - R,-1 ), r, 
(k + ln P0 - l)- IR1 + -
1 Pi 
Po 
M 
d + f3 var1_1 [P, ] 
Demand-side equilibrium yields the following aggregate demand function, 
( 1 7) 
( 1 8) 
The aggregate equilibrium condition is derived by setting aggregate demand equal to current output plus inventory 
holdings carried over from the prior period. 
AD Y AS + !  I I 1-1 
where, 
Y/1°\' b1 E1_1 [P, ]+ u, 
Solving ( 1 9) and rearranging yields, 
( 1 9) 
c + e(L)Pi + Or(E, [Pi+1 ]- Pi ) = r(E,-1 [P, ]- Pi 1 )+  bE,_1 [Pi ] +  (L}P,_1 + (v1 - Ou, ) (20) !Po !Po 
where, 
C = r(m - k - Po + 1) (1- O) > 0 
l 
24 
lf we define the Jong-run average price attained when expectations are realized by P = C , and redefine 
b + L (1 - e) !Po 
the following variables in mean deviation form, p1 = P, - P, E,+J-I [Pi+J ] = E,+J-I [P,+J ]- P , we get 
Following Turnovsky (1983), we take conditional expectations of (21) at time t-1 for an arbitrary period j = 0, 1, 2, 
. . .  t+j , which yields, 
BrE,_ 1  [P1+j+I ]- (r(l + BOJ ) + b )E,_ 1  [P1 +j ]+ YOJfJ1 +j-l = 0 (22) 
This is a second order difference equation in the predictions E,_1 [Pi+J ] ,  the solution to which is 
where J1 , Ai are the roots of the quadratic equation, 
b (BJ - lXA - OJ ) = -A 
The roots of this equation are real and positive such that O < J1 < _!._ < I, Ai > OJ > 2 
(23) 
(24) 
We take only the root that is less than one, as this is consistent with our assumption that the path of future price 
expectations is stationary. Hence, A2 = 0 ,  and the solution to (23) is 
Et-I [Pt+j-1 ] = k{ A1 
setting j=O, yields the following initial condition, 
E,_I [P,+ j-1 ] = k{ P1-I 
Substituting into (22) yields, 
simplifying yields, 
_ 1 + T/1 h n.. P, - A1P1-I 
Br(OJ - A1
) ' W ere T/1 = uul - vi 
Hence, the one period variance in prices can be written as, 
2 
2 cr,1 CTp (I) = ( ( ))2 Br OJ - Ai 
with asymptotic variance, 
(25) 
(26) 
(27) 
(28) 
(29) 
Likewise, expressing the interest rate in mean deviation form, 
yields the following one period variance in interest rates, 
2 (1) -
o-;, (l ) _ 0-� 
0-R 
- ------'---
(!Po )2 (!Po )2 (Or(w },1 ))2 
with asymptotic variance, 
Moreover, taking expectations of (28) yields, 
Pu 
b 
1 +  �_;;__ 
Oy(w l1 ) 
c + ao-I, (l) 
y = J 
d + /Jo-;, (1) 
Oy(w - l1 ) 
Interest Rate Volatil ity in the Presence of Futures Markets. 
(30) 
(3 1 )  
(32) 
(33) 
In the presence of futures markets, a demand-side equi l ibrium is estab lished i n  the goods, money and 
futures markets simultaneously (34). 
C, + 11 + u, = Y, goods market 
M d = M 8 money market 
Z r  xI 1-1 + H 
where 
0 fi,tures market 
(34) 
25 
E,_1 [u, J = 0, E1-1 (u;] = rr,; 
Demand-side equilibrium yields the following aggregate demand function, 
AD : Y, 
(m - k p0 + 1) ( I l () [ ] () [( I l l 0 - - - 1 + £1 f'i+i + - -- - 1 m f'i + Ou1 Id Fj d d F1 d Fj d 
where, 
I 
(
I I
) 
I I 
Fi - - + - + - +  ' var,_ 1[Pi ] a /J c d 
and dY, AD < 0, - > 0 dP1 dm 
I I I 
F2 , = 
1 
[ / 
_!_ + 1 - Pv var1-1 [v1 ]l var1_ 1 P, l a /J ) 
(35) 
Next, the aggregate equilibrium condition is derived, where aggregate demand is  set equal to current output plus 
investory holdings carried over from the prior period. 
AD, y AS + I I 1-1 
where, 
AS - I / Y, - -P1_1 + v, c 
Solving (36) and rearranging yields, 
I 
) ( 
I I 
- I mP, -+ 
fid c 
! }vP,_ 1 + (v, - eu,) 
where, 
(m k p0 + 1) [(0 - l{_l - l) - -1 l > O 
Id \ F1d F1c 
(36) 
(37) 
As before, i fwe define the long-run average price attained when expectations are realized by 
--------------- , and redefine the fo llowing variables in mean deviation form, 
+ �  )- F2 (0 1 ) 
26 
P, Pi -P, E1+.J-I [P1+J ]=  E,+ i-1 [Pi +; ]-P , we get 
(38) 
27 
Once again, following Turnovsky ( 1 983), we take conditional expectations of (38) at time t- 1 for an arbitrary period 
j = 0, I, 2, . . .  t+j, which yields, 
(39) 
This is a second order difference equation in the predictions E1 _ 1 [P, +t+l ] , the solution to which is 
(40) 
where ;t1 , }"2 are the roots of the quadratic equation, 
(42) 
Fj 
The roots of this equation are real and positive such that O < A1 < _!_ < I, ;t2 > w > I 
O F2 
Once again, we take only the root that is less than one, as this is consistent with our assumption that the path of 
future price expectations is stationary. Hence, A2 = 0 ,  and the solution to (40) is 
(4 1 )  
setting j=O, yields the following initial condition, 
E,_1 [P1+J-1 ] = Ai P1-1 (42) 
Substituting into (39) yields, 
simplifying yields, 
P1 = l1 P,-1 + 
(}
[( 
1 
77
)
' r; ) '  where rz, = Bt,, - v, 
- 1 - - w - - 21 d Fjd F1 
(44) 
Hence, the one period variance in prices, i n  the presence of futures markets, can be written as, 
ut (I ) = ---------..,--
[ %[(1 - F:d )m 
with asymptotic variance, 
Simi larly, the one period variance in interest rates can be expressed as 
(tP0 )
2 
with asymptotic variance, 
Moreover, taking expectations of(44) yields, 
Pu = -�-----�--
- F:d )w 
Pu = 
A Review of Solutions in the Absence and Presence of Futures Contracts 
Absence: 
p 
b + L(1 - B) !Po 
(45) 
(46) 
(47) 
(48) 
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2 (YT/ 
(Y p (I) = ( ( ))2 Br w - A1 
2 
2 (YT/ a-p = (1 - ,1,f Xer(w - A1 ))2 
2 (1) - a-;, (1) - a-; a-
R 
-
(!Po )2 - (!Po )2 (ey(w - ,1,1 ))2 
2 2 
2 CYp CIT/ 
(Y
R
= 
(!Po )2 = (!Po )
2 (1 - ,1,f Xer(w - A1 ))
2 
I I 
Pu
= 
r(w - ,1,1 ) ' Pu
= -
Br(w - ,1,1 ) 
2 
1 + aa-u 
b =  Br(w - ,1,1 ) 
c + aa-l, (1) 
I r = - - -
d + f]a-;, (1) 
b 
(BA - IXA - W ) = -A r 
Presence: 
- -Cr P = 
[(e - if-
1 -1) - �1 )(F2 + LJ - F2 (B - I) 
\ F;d fie d 
29 
2 ] ] ] (JV 
c,i(I) a + P + !!_((.1 -_J -)m 
d Fjd 
F. - - F l e d _ 2 Jc { 
]. 1 j ld +f!_O!..j (tU - 1  ;t cu - c 
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Appendix 2. The Data 
United States Short-term interest rates: 
Macaulay's call money rates at the New York Stock Exchange, 1861:01 - 1936: 12, 
Source: 
Macaulay, Frederick R. 1938. The Movement of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices In The United 
States Since 1856. National Bureau of Economic Research, New York. PP. A l42-161. Col (1). 
Macaulay's commercial paper rate, 1836:01 - 1936:12, 
Source: 
Macaulay, Frederick R. 1938. The Movement of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices In The United 
States Since 1856. National Bureau of Economic Research, New York. 
1836:01 - 1860:12: 
PP. A248-250. Boston. Rates are averages of Bigelow's reported "beginning," "middle, " and "end" of month. 
Bigelow describes these rates as "street rates on first class-paper in Boston ... at the beginning, middle, and end 
of the month."5 1  
1861:01 - 1936:12: 
PP. A 142-161. Col (3). New York. From 1860 to 1923: 12 ' choice 60-90 day two name paper'; from 1924:01 
to 1936:12 '4 to 6 month prime double and single name paper.' 
Macaulay's 3-month time money rate in New York City, 1890:0 I - 1936: 12, 
Source: 
Macaulay, Frederick R. 1938. The Movement of Interest Rates, Bond Yields and Stock Prices In The United 
States Since 1856. National Bureau of Economic Research, New York. PP. Al50-161. Col (2). 
MM&W's 3-month time money rate in New York City, 1890:01 - 1936:12, 
Source: 
Mankiw, N. Gregory and Jeffrey A. Miron. 1985. "The Changing Behavior of the Term Structure of Interest 
Rates," NEER Working Paper #1669. "Three Month Rate." Mankiw and Mankiw and Miron (1985) state 
that: 
"These data are time rates available at New York banks from 1890 to 1958; they are interest rates banks 
charged for loans of fixed maturity. In 1910, the National Monetary Commission compiled these data from 
1890 to 1909 by tabulating them from the Financial Review, a periodical that analyzed current financial 
market developments. We updated this series to 1958 using the Review and the Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle, which took over the Review in 1921." 
Data are from the first week of each month. 52 
MM& W's 3-month time money rate in New York City, 1890:0 I - 1968:05 
Source: 
Mankiw, N. Gregory and Jeffrey A. Miron. 1985. "The Changing Behavior of the Term Structure of Interest 
Rates," NEER Working Paper #1669. "Three Month Rate." These data are the 3-month Treasury bill yields 
during the first week of each month. 
Regional antebellum interest rates on short-term bills of exchange, 
Boston, 1836:01-1859:12, 
Charleston, 1838:01-1859: 12, 
New Orleans, 1839:11-1859:12, 
Philadelphia, l 839:02-1857:06. 
Source: 
51 For the period 1 836:0 1 - 1 859: 1 2  these data are also found in Bodenhorn ( 1 992) 
" See footnote 9 of Miron ( 1 988). 
Bodenhom, Howard. 1 992. "Capital Mobility and Financial Integration in Antebellum America," Journal 
of Economic History, 52(3), Sep., pp. 603-608; Boston, col( l ); Charleston, col(5); New 
Orleans, col(6); Philadelph ia, col(4). 
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Source : Bodenhorn ( 1 992) 
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Figure 2.a Seasonal Patterns and Standard Errors, Macaulay's Paper Rate, 1 836.0 1 - 1 874. 1 2  
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Figure 2 .b .  Seasonal Patterns and Standard Errors , Macau lay's Paper Rate, 1 875 .01 - 1 91 0 . 1 2  
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Figure 2.c .  Seasonal Patterns and Standard Errors , Macau lay's Paper Rate , 1 920.0 1 -1 933. 1 2  
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